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U.S. and European Freight Railways:
The Differences That Matter
by Francisco Manuel Bastos Andrade Furtado
This	paper	examines	the	differences	between	the	United	States	(U.S.)	and	European	(EU27)	freight	
railways.	The	inherent	or	structural	factors	influencing	the	railways	modal	share	will	be	evaluated.	
It	was	found	that	nearly	all	of	the	disparity	in	modal	share	can	be	explained	by	structural	or	inherent	
differences,	like	the	competitiveness	of	non-surface	modes,	shipment	distances	(both	influenced	by	
geography),	and	commodity	mix	(namely,	coal).	More	striking	are	the	differences	in	productivity,	
to	move	the	same	number	of	tons	seven	times,	more	trains	are	required	in	Europe	compared	with	
the	U.S..	 Operational	 revenues	 per	 ton-mile	 are	 around	 two	 times	 higher	 in	 Europe,	 while	 the	
operational	expenses	in	the	U.S.	are	four	times	lower	than	in	Europe.	It	is	argued	that	setting	a	goal	
for	modal	share	similar	to	the	U.S.	is	not	realistic	for	the	EU27.	A	key	concern	for	European	freight	
railways	should	be	the	reduction	of	operational	costs,	by	increasing	the	trains’	sizes.
Distinct	policy	answers	were	given	to	the	railroads’	crisis	in	the	post	WWII	years.	Soon	after	
1980	when	reforms	were	introduced	in	the	U.S.	there	was	a	revival	of	the	sector.	The	same	has	not	
happened	 in	 Europe,	 where	 questions	 regarding	 infrastructure	 financing	 or	 the	 coordination	 of	
network	investments	and	operational	needs	remain.
INTRODUCTION
Over the last 30 years, the U.S. rail freight industry has witnessed an increase in its modal share, 
productivity, and profitability (Association of American Railroads 2012, Shi, Lim, and Chi 
2011). In Europe (EU27), the industry has been unable to achieve the same results, even after the 
introduction of legislative and regulatory reforms that started in 1991 and culminated in 2007 with 
the implementation of full open access for freight rail operators (European Commission 2010, 
European Commission 2009b).
There are significant differences between the United Stated (U.S.) and European freight 
railways and these differences can be classified into three broad groups. First, there are structural 
or inherent natural disparities (Table 1), that can limitedly (or not at all) be changed by any level of 
decision making. Second, train characteristics (Table 4) and operations vary widely between the two 
areas (Table 5). Third, both in Europe and the U.S., railways faced a deep crisis in the post World 
War II years, but the policy answers and how the market evolved followed distinct paths (Table 6).
It was found that the disparity in modal share can be mostly explained by structural or inherent 
differences like the competitiveness of non-surface modes, shipment distances (both influenced by 
geography), and commodity mix (namely, coal and other bulk materials). More striking than the 
differences in modal share are the discrepancies in productivity and train sizes with U.S. railways 
greatly surpassing the European ones. Soon after 1980, when major regulatory reforms were 
introduced in the U.S., there was a revival of the sector. The same has not happened in Europe, 
where questions regarding infrastructure financing or the coordination of network investments and 
operational needs remain. But other factors, besides legislative reform, influenced both the U.S. 
revival and the anaemic European results.
All of the above—structural, operational, and policy factors—impact the performance of the 
freight rail industry. When comparing the railroads’ stance in the U.S. and Europe, all these factors 
should be taken into account. This paper attempts to provide a comparative analysis that covers the 
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key factors conditioning the freight railroads on both sides of the Atlantic and contrast them. The 
goal is to be able to contribute to answering the following question: what are the differences that 
really matter? More precisely, given the underperformance of European railways when compared 
with the U.S., are there any guidelines that can be obtained to foster the industry in Europe from 
a comparative analysis with the U.S.? On the other hand, are there any lessons from the European 
experience that can be useful for U.S. railroads and policy makers? In addition, can valuable insights 
be obtained for other regions in the world where rail freight plays an important role in the economy 
or is intended to do so?
In the European Union (EU), the Commission’s 4th Railway package proposal that reinforces 
the separation between infrastructure and operations is under discussion and awaiting approval by 
the European parliament (European Commission 2013). In the U.S., there are requests to reform 
existent legislation and change the current switch agreements (Surface Transportation Board 2012). 
In Brazil, a major expansion of the rail network is planned, as well as a change in the railroads’ 
governance model (Governo Federal Brasil 2012). These are some examples of current policy 
proceedings that might benefit from the insights provided by this paper. Moreover, in these policy 
discussions, features of other regions’ railroad models are often mentioned, but they are generally 
handpicked and taken out of context. One example is the discussion in the European Commission 
(2013) regarding infrastructure governance. In that document, the North American model of parallel 
competition is mentioned and is immediately followed by a defense of EU endeavors to reinforce 
the separation of infrastructure managers (that run the network) and rail undertakings (that run the 
train services). The fact that this separation is the opposite of one of the cornerstone elements of the 
current North American model, vertically integrated railroads, is not mentioned.
This paper is divided into four parts. First, a literature review of other studies in this area of 
research is presented. Second, the modal share in the two regions will be compared. A measure of 
the effect of the structural differences in the gap between shares will be provided. It follows a similar 
methodology to Vassallo and Fagan (2007), which is briefly described in the literature review. Third, 
productivity indicators (including financial results) will be presented. The disproportion between 
these numbers will be discussed, including the influence of structural differences, plus the impact 
of the train characteristics and operations. Fourth, the diverse policy and market answers will be 
examined. Conclusions will then be delivered, highlighting the differences that matter and providing 
some guidelines for European freight railways improvement.
For the analysis, the insights provided by several interviews with academics and industry 
representatives, plus visits to rail terminals and yards, were valuable. Both these visits and interviews 
were done in the U.S. and the EU (Furtado 2012).
LITERATURE REVIEW
This research area has been addressed by several academic and non-academic studies. Vassallo 
and Fagan (2007) focused their research on the modal share difference measured in ton-km (tkm) 
between the U.S. and European freight railways. Their aim was to quantify how much of the 
existing difference can be attributed to structural factors and how much to policy differences, thus 
determining if it was plausible for the EU to increase rail´s modal share by adjusting its policies.
The year 2000 was chosen for this analysis. The authors identified four inherent differences: 
the transportation volume (total tkm over all modes), competitive position of non-surface modes 
(coastwise/sea, inland waterways, and pipeline), shipment distances, and commodity mix. For each 
of these differences, the structural conditions of Europe are sequentially applied to the U.S., while 
maintaining the relative difference between the U.S. road and rail modes – e.g., to assess the impact 
of the transportation volume, the U.S. percentage share of each mode is kept, but the total tkm 
applied is the European value. The 38% U.S. rail modal share was applied to a 3,068 billion tkm 
total movement, which is the European total; the U.S. total was 6,495 billion tkm. So, if the total 
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transportation volume in the U.S. would be the same as in Europe, the U.S. railroads would have 
moved 1,166 billion tkm (not the 2,468 billion actually moved). For measuring the impact of the 
competitiveness of the non-surface modes, the non-surface modes share in Europe was applied 
while keeping the U.S. road/rail relation. So, in Europe, the non-surface modes have a 48.24% share 
(in the U.S. it’s 35.4%), which means that road+rail modes have a 51.76% share. The U.S. road/rail 
relation is 26.6/38.00=0.7. So in the U.S., the rail share would be 51.76/1.7=30.45%. Considering 
the previous 1,166 billion tkm total, the U.S. would move 934 billion tkm. Thus, the higher 
competitiveness of the non-surface modes in Europe explain 232 billion tkm (1,166 - 934 billion) of 
the U.S.-EU rail freight volume gap. A similar logic is then applied to evaluate the shipment distance 
and commodity mix differences. All the numbers presented above were taken from the article.
The authors found that about 83% of the modal share difference was probably due to natural 
differences. It is argued that the remaining difference (17%) is presumably due to public policy 
differences like priority of passenger services, lack of productivity-enhancement infrastructure, and 
lack of incentives of the rail operators (lack of competition between rail companies). It is stated that 
“One policy difference which is unlikely to impact the residual is the European Union’s requirement 
to separate infrastructure from operations and require open access.” In fact, it is suggested that 
unbundling infrastructure from operations as a way to introduce competition might be one of the 
ways of increasing the European railroads’ market share, having a somewhat similar affect to what 
deregulation did in the U.S.
Rodrigue and Notteboom (2010) present a qualitative analysis of the different configurations 
of the European and North American transport and logistics networks. They point to several 
relevant contrasts, e.g., the higher number of ports in Europe when compared with North America, 
the shorter distances between the ports and respective hinterlands in Europe, the nonexistence in 
Europe of anything like the land bridge between the east and west coasts in North America, the more 
concentrated nature of traffic flows along certain corridors, and thus the possibility of bigger scale 
economies in North America. Regulatory, policy, and governance differences are also discussed. 
Europe’s multitude of nations with their respective histories and cultures means that coordinated 
action is much more difficult to attain than in North America. Important infrastructure projects are 
designed in a more national than continental logic. The market is much more fragmented and less 
homogeneous than in the U.S. and there is a higher need of customization for each specific national 
market, thus there is less room to take advantage of scale economies in distribution centers and 
networks.
Pouryousef, Lautala, and White (2013) provide a review of capacity definitions used in both 
Europe and the U.S., followed by a description of differences in the respective rail systems regarding 
infrastructure and operations. They then present several methodologies to evaluate capacity, 
including case studies both in the U.S. and Europe. In Europe, the preponderance of passenger 
services and corresponding requirement of on-time performance for train services requires a level 
of reliability that is typically secured through structured/planned/scheduled operations. In the U.S., 
operations commonly follow a more flexible dispatching pattern. This difference leads to different 
metrics, concepts, and methodologies to evaluate capacity. The European rail networks typically 
take advantage of several commercial simulation software available in Europe, which have been 
developed based on the timetable compression concept, while the U.S. railroads usually apply the 
non-timetable-based simulation, in addition to the general analytical tools and modeling approaches. 
The authors argue that as the U.S. continues developing its passenger traffic on shared corridors, the 
future operational patterns of shared corridors in the U.S. will likely have a closer resemblance to 
the European shared-use lines. The accuracy of capacity analysis methods becomes more important, 
and tools applied in Europe may become more applicable to the U.S. conditions as well.
Drew (1999) reviews the history of rail legislative and regulatory reforms in North America 
and different parts of Europe. The study underlines that the ideal form of regulation depends on a 
number of other inter-related choices, like the type of ownership of the assets, vertical separation or 
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integration, open access. or limited access. Furthermore, these choices should take into account the 
particularities of the market for rail services, e.g., whether freight or passenger services dominate the 
railway. In the conclusion, the author warns that open access might not always maximize efficiency 
since it can reduce the fragile profitability margin of railway operators acting in certain markets.
Posner (2008) bases his essay on the experience he had as a manager and investor in freight 
railways both in the U.S. and Europe. This work mentions several physical and geographical 
differences between Europe and North America that condition the freight railroads’ activity, but 
the article emphasizes the institutional differences. Posner argues that parallel competition between 
vertically integrated railroads in the U.S. was a result of deregulation, whereas on-rail perfect 
competition in Europe was artificially induced by restraining regulations. Moreover, while EU 
policymakers’ efforts were focused on promoting intra-rail competition, important service and 
capacity requirements were not considered.
Concerning the available literature, the present paper brings three key contributions. First, 
it updates the discussion on this area, whether it is on the modal share trends or regulation and 
its impacts on the railroads’ performance. Second, it presents a comprehensive analysis that 
encompasses several factors that influence the freight railroads’ activity which are inter-related, 
such as structural factors, productivity and profitability, operational logic, institutional framework 
and history of the legislative reforms. Third, productivity and profitability differences are mentioned 
in other studies, but not with the emphasis presented here. 
MODAL SHARE AND STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCES
In 2009, the rail share of the modal split, based on tkm, was 36.8% in the U.S. (the mode with the 
highest share) and 9.9% in EU27 (below road and sea). This gap has existed for several decades 
(Figure 1) and it is mentioned in several European publications, including policy setting European 
Commission documents (European Commission 2001).
Figure 1: EU27 and U.S. Freight Transport Modal Split (% based on tkm)
Source: Eurostat, U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS), DOT-
BTS 2004.
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There are structural factors that limit the share of rail in Europe when compared with the U.S. 
Europe has around half the land mass of the U.S., but more than three times the U.S. coast line. 
This limits the shipments’ distances for surface modes in Europe, where there is no equivalent to 
the inland coast-to-coast trips in the U.S. While in the U.S., 48% of the shipments (in ton-miles) of 
surface modes (road and rail) are above 1,200 km, in EU27, only 15% are above 1,000 km (Eurostat, 
DOT-BTS 2010, Tavasszy and Meijeren 2011).
Furthermore, geography is a major factor in creating higher competitiveness of the sea mode 
(coastal shipping) in Europe (36.7% of the modal share in 2009) compared with the U.S. (4.6% of 
the modal share in 2009); adding to geography, the sea mode is constrained in the U.S. by the Jones 
Act of 19201 (Rodrigue and Notteboom 2010). As for other non-surface modes – inland waterways 
(river and lakes) and pipelines – they have higher shares in the U.S. than in Europe. While in the 
U.S. inland waterways and pipelines move, respectively, 6.5% and 21.1% of the total ton-miles; in 
Europe they have a 3.6% and 3.1% share. The difference in the pipelines’ modal share is significant, 
which is probably due to geography and because the U.S. produces more petroleum products than 
Europe. Still, the combined share of non-surface modes (sea, inland waterways, pipelines) is higher 
in Europe (43.7%) than in the U.S. (32.2%) (Eurostat, DOT-BTS).
Another key factor is the type of goods moved. Rail is especially suited for heavy low-value 
commodities over long distances. In the U.S., coal accounts for about 29% of the ton-miles of 
surface modes and around 44% of the ton-miles moved by rail, while in Europe, it is less than 3% 
of the surface modes and around 13% for rail (DOT-BTS 2010, Eurostat).
Table 1: Structural Differences
Europe	(EU27) U.S. Comments
Geography Area = 4,414 
thousand km2
Coastline = 65,993 
km
Area = 9,629 
thousand km2 
Coastline = 19,924 
km
Higher competiveness of 
sea mode in Europe. Higher 
inland shipment distances in 
the U.S. 
Commodity 
Mix
More manufactured 
goods
More raw materials Higher share of bulk, high 
weight and low value 
commodities more suitable 
for rail in the U.S.
Source: Eurostat, DOT-BTS, CIA World Factbook
To measure the impact of these factors in the gap between the rail modal share in the U.S. and 
Europe, the methodology applied will be similar to Vassallo and Fagan (2007), briefly described in 
the literature review. But there are three important differences. First, it will be taken into account the 
fact that the statistics in the U.S. exclude intra-city truck movements (Dennis 2005), underestimating 
this mode share. The latest estimates found for those numbers are in DOT-BTS (2004) and they can 
be seen in Figure 1. According to this, the U.S. rail share in 2002 would be 27.8%, below road’s 
32.1% share. Second, the data for this analysis refer to the last year with comparable estimates 
(2009), not to 2000. Third, Europe is represented by the EU27 (which includes Central and Eastern 
Europe), not the EU15 (which only includes Western Europe).
The estimation involved five steps (see Table 2). The data sources for the calculations were the 
Eurostat and DOT-BTS databases, plus Tavasszy and Meijeren (2011). 
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Table 2: Structural Factors Influence on Europe and U.S. Rail Share Differential2
Vassallo	and	Fagan	-	2000 Furtado	–	2009
Value 
(million tkm)
%
of gap
Value 
(million tkm)
%
of gap
Total gap 925,794 100% 903,385 100%
Structural	factors	share	of	the	gap
Non-Surface/ Sea mode - Step 3 231,748 25.0% 237,847 26.3%
Shipment distances - Step 4 413,104 44.6% 413,206 45.7%
Commodity mix/ Coal - Step 5 123,680 13.4% 237,831 26.3%
Not explained by structural factors 157,262 17.0% 14,502 1.6%
Contribution of structural factors 768,532 83.0% 888,884 98.4%
Source: Eurostat, DOT-BTS, Vassallo and Fagan (2007), Tavasszy and Meijeren (2011)
The first step was to take into account intra city trucks. To do this, the ton-miles of the road/truck 
mode in the U.S. were increased so that this mode would obtain the same share as rail. According 
to DOT-BTS, in 2009, rail moved 1,582,093 million ton-miles and trucks moved 1,321,396 million 
ton-miles. It was assumed for the subsequent steps that the truck mode actually moved the same 
1,582,093 million ton-miles as rail. By doing this, U.S. rail obtains a 35% modal share (below 
the original 36.8%) equal to truck. Other modes also see their shares slightly decreased. This is 
a conservative approach, since in the later estimates available road share was actually above rail 
(DOT-BTS 2004).
In the second step, the U.S. rail share (35%) is applied to Europe´s total tkm movements 
(3,646,788 million tkm), to take into account that the total tkm in Europe for all modes is around 
half of the U.S. (the U.S. total movements correspond to 7,343,465 million tkm). So, if in EU27 
the rail share would be the same as in the U.S., there would be 1.264 trillion tkm moved by rail (0
.34672086×3,646,788=1,264,417). According to Eurostat, 0.36 trillion tkm were actually moved 
by rail in Europe in 2009. This means that there is a 0.903 trillion tkm difference (1,264,417-
361,032=903,385) between what European rails actually moved and what they would move had 
they a modal share equivalent to the U.S. 
How much of this 0.903 trillion tkm gap can be attributed to structural differences? This is 
evaluated in the next three steps.
In the third step, the sea and other non-surface modes European share (43.7%) is applied to the 
U.S. (30.66% share for non-surface modes), while keeping the same road/rail ratio (1 for the U.S.). 
In this way the higher competitiveness of non-surface modes in Europe (namely sea, since there is 
a lower share of pipelines and inland waterways in Europe) is taken into account. In this situation 
the Road+Rail share in the U.S. would be equal to 56.3% (100-43.7). The U.S. road/rail relation 
would be kept (road/rail share=1). So the U.S. rail share would drop to 28% (56.3%×0.5=28.15%). 
In Europe, a 28% share would represent 1.026 trillion tkm (0.2815×3,646,788=1,026,571). When 
the higher share of non-surface modes in Europe is taken into account, the gap between European 
and U.S. rail share is reduced. The gap would be 0.66 trillion tkm (1,026,571-361,032=665,539) not 
0.903 trillion tkm (as calculated in the second step). So of the modal share gap, around 0.238 trillion 
tkm (903,385-665,539=237,847, or simply 1,264,417-1,026,571=237,847) can be explained by the 
different competitive advantages of non-surface modes in Europe.
The fourth step takes into account the differences in shipment distance. The European 
distribution of surface modes tkm according to shipment distance class is applied to the U.S. rail 
share (versus road) by distance class. European shipment distance characteristics are applied to 
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the U.S. rail vs road competiveness. For instance, in Europe 15% of the surface modes tkm (the 
total tkm for surface modes is 2,053,142=0.563×3,646,788) are for shipments above 1000 km (this 
corresponds to around 0.317 trillion tkm = 2,053,142×0.1546 ). In the U.S., rail has about 70% of 
the surface mode share for shipments above 1000 km. So, for the distance class above 1000 km, 
rail would move 0.22 trillion tkm (317.366×0.7=222,156). The same calculations are performed 
for the other distance classes (0-50; 50-150; 150-500 and 500-1000 km) and then summed. In this 
scenario, rail would have moved 0.613 trillion tkm. So, 0.413 trillion tkm of the gap (1,026,571-
613,365=413,206) can be explained by the longer shipment distances in the U.S. 
The fifth and last step is to take into account the differences in commodity mix, namely coal. 
The U.S. proportion of coal in the tkm of surface modes (almost 30%) is applied to the European 
modal split between rail and road by commodities (it is 80% for coal and 8% for others). Had 
Europe moved the same share of coal as the U.S., 0.599 trillion tkm would have been moved by 
rail. This would represent a 66% increase compared with current numbers. That increase of 0.238 
trillion tkm (598,863-361,032=237,831) corresponds to the difference accounted for by coal in the 
modal share gap. 
The results show that Europe´s and the U.S.’ rail share differential can be mostly explained by 
the structural differences, nearly all for 2009 and around 80% for 2000. This divergence is related 
to the increase in the fraction of coal in the commodity mix in the U.S. (from 23% in 2000 to 29% 
in 2009). Moreover, there was a reduction of the starting gap caused by two factors. First, in 2009, 
there was a correction of the U.S. value to take into account intra city trucks (Vassallo and Fagan 
2007, for the year 2000 had a 38% share for rail, versus a 35% share applied in this study). Second, 
the EU27 in 2009 had a higher rail share (9.9%) than the EU15 in 2000 (7.8%). The EU27 includes 
the Central-Eastern European countries that on average have higher rail shares than Western Europe. 
See Figure 4.
The structural factor that has the highest impact is the difference in inland shipment distances, 
which explains around 46% (almost half) of the differential. The higher competiveness of non-
surface modes in Europe and the differences in the importance of coal explain (for 2009) a similar 
amount of the gap, about 26% each. This analysis was based on the comparison of tkm. If the 
measure to compare would be in tons moved, the results would be different. For 2010, rail moved 
1,515,332 thousand tons in Europe and 1,850,996 thousand tons in the U.S., which means 18% 
less in Europe (Eurostat, DOT-BTS). A much smaller starting gap than if measured in tkm (86% 
less in Europe). The difference in distances not only allows the rail industry in the U.S. to capture a 
higher share of the market, it also means that each ton moved by rail goes a much longer distance, 
multiplying the U.S. tkm vis	à	vis the EU27.
When comparing the U.S.’ and Europe’s railways performance measured by modal share, the 
difference is marginal (if the structural constraints existing in Europe versus the U.S. are accounted 
for). Therefore, it is not reasonable to expect the EU27 railways to ever achieve a similar modal 
share to the U.S., even less to set this as a policy target. So, is this the difference that matters?
PRODUCTIVITY
To move the same number of tons, around seven times more trains are necessary in Europe. For a 
thousand tons the U.S. Class I railroads require 0.28 trains; in Europe it is 1.94 (Figure 2). Even 
taking into account the higher costs of the larger U.S. trains, this is a very significant distinction that 
implies that European railways have much higher costs per ton and tkm, which is the case. As shown 
in Figure 3, the operational revenues per ton-mile are higher in Europe, almost two times more than 
in the U.S. (DB Shenker, being the largest European freight railway, will be used in the comparison, 
and data for CP Carga the main Portuguese freight railway are also presented). But the operational 
expenses are almost four times higher than the ones in the U.S. In fact, European railways are barely 
profitable or not profitable at all (European Commission 2009b). 
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Figure 2: Number of Trains Per Tons Moved (thousand) in 2010
0.00
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US Class I CSX BNSF KCS Soo Europe DB Shenker
Rail
CP Carga
Source Eurostat; Association of American Railroads (AAR); Surface Transportation Board (2010); DB, CP 
Carga annual reports.
Having more trains (even if smaller) for less cargo moved implies higher fixed and variable 
costs. It implies more labor, line capacity use, and a smaller net/gross tons ratio per train for the 
same amount of goods moved. This explains to a large extent why U.S. railways are profitable and 
have been financially stable for the last 10 years, while in Europe their financial situation is, at best, 
precarious.
Besides the train’s weight/length, the much longer shipment distances also contribute to a 
higher productivity in the U.S., especially if the outputs are measured in ton-miles. In Europe, the 
length of haul is mainly restrained by structural factors already mentioned. There are fewer long 
distance inland shipments than in the U.S. There are also interoperability barriers in the EU27 that 
are nonexistent in the U.S., such as different gauges, signalling systems, and electric systems (in the 
U.S. there is almost no electrification, while in the EU27, half the lines are electrified).
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Figure 3: Operational Revenues and Expenses for U.S. and European Freight Railways 
 in 2010
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Op. Revenues per ton mile (dollars) Op. Expenses per ton mile (dollars)
Source: Association of American Railroads (AAR); Surface Transportation Board (2010); DB, CP Carga 
annual reports.
Table 3: Freight Railways Statistics for 2010
Average3 trains	per
Length 
of haul 
(miles)
net tons 
(per train)
A
tons
(thousands)
B
ton-miles
(million)
trains
(B/C)
tons
(thousands)
ton-miles 
(million)
U.S. Class I 913.6 3585 1,850,996 1,691,000 516,338 0.28 0.31
CSX 549.2 2902 417,303 229,172 143,789 0.34 0.63
BNSF 1114.3 1330 580,206 646,549 436,295 0.75 0.67
KSC 390.7 3692 75,833 29,629 20,540 0.27 0.69
Soo 426.7 2902 77,703 33,157 26,771 0.34 0.81
Europe 159.9 516 1,515,332 242,335 2,938,746 1.94 12.13
DB Shenker 
Rail 158.3 502 415,500 64,737 826,921 1.99 12.58
CP Carga 138.6 304 9,224 1,278 30,331 3.29 23.73
Source: Eurostat; Association of American Railroads (AAR); Surface Transportation Board (2010); DB, CP   
 Carga annual reports.
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As for the trains’ weight, the structural factors also have some influence. Heavier trains on 
average are expected in the U.S. versus EU27 since the commodities shipped by rail in the U.S. are 
heavier, and include more bulk and fewer manufactured goods than in Europe. Still, this is not the 
main explanation for the huge discrepancy in the average tons per train (86% less in Europe). In 
fact, if the comparison is made only between heavy bulk trains, most of the difference concerning 
tons per train remains. The disparity in the train’s average weight is much more a result of the 
infrastructure and equipment constraints in Europe than any structural factor (see Table 4).
Table 4: Train Characteristics
Length (feet/m) Containers (40’ – 2 TEUs) 
per Intermodal train5
Net tons per bulk 
train (typical)Typical Maximum4
U.S. Class I 6500/2000 10000/3000 150-300 9000-12000
Europe 1640/500 2460/750 25-50 1200-2000
Source: several industry reports
Nonetheless, to reach a financially stable situation, European railways do not need to have 
trains with the exact same characteristics as in the U.S. They do need to get bigger, but not to 
the same level. The fuel prices in Europe are around double that of the U.S., which increases the 
railways costs, but also allows them to have higher charges (the effect of higher fuel costs is felt 
more by trucks than rail [Owens, Seedah, and Harrison 2013]). Road charges are applied much 
more extensively in Europe than in the U.S. (increasing the costs of the road mode, which also 
allows higher charges by rail), e.g., in the U.S., only about 6% of the interstate highway system has 
tolls (Weiss 2008). In Italy and France, almost all the motorways (Autostrade and Autoroutes) have 
tolls and in Germany, there is a “truck-toll” (LKW-Maut) for all trucks that drive on the motorways 
(Autobahnen).
Besides the train size, other features also constrain European freight railways’ productivity (see 
Table 5). The existence of passenger trains, which constitute 79% of the train-kms in the European 
rail network, have priority over freight trains (Eurostat 2007). Access to the network and dispatching 
flexibility is more constrained in Europe. Additionally, in the U.S., investments in the past 40 years 
were focused on increasing freight trains’ productivity (Martland 2012) by: increase in train length 
(with associated changes in terminals and increase in sidings); increase in the net weight per rail car; 
and increase in track resistance and double stacking of containers (with the associated increase in 
clearances). In Europe, investment was concentrated on passenger services, namely, high speed rail. 
Since 1990, there was a 545% increase in the length of high speed lines (some of which cannot be 
used by freight), while the total rail network had a 10% decrease (Eurostat, European Commission 
2012).
Even more striking than the difference in modal share are the differences in productivity. More 
importantly, there are strong structural restraints on increasing the railways modal share in Europe. 
They also affect productivity, but to a lesser extent. One of the key restrictions in productivity, the 
train size, is more limited by a lack of investment due to other priorities than any unchangeable 
natural obstacle.
A key concern of all agents involved in fostering freight railways in Europe should be to decrease 
the costs per unit moved (ton and tkm). To achieve this, one of the solutions is to increase the net 
tons per train and reduce the number of trains. Other strategies include restructuring the services 
offered (namely by dropping unprofitable services/routes), changes in charges to the customers, and 
a concentration of efforts and investments on the network segments that will provide higher returns.
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Table 5: Train Operations
Europe	(EU27) U.S. Comments
Scheduling Most services follow a strict schedule
There are some scheduled 
services, namely for intermodal 
trains (generally these schedules 
are not strict having 1-3 hours 
lags). In many cases the 
dispatchers define the arrival and 
departure times to maximize the 
load per train
In Europe the railway operators 
do not control scheduling it is an 
Infrastructure manager decision. 
Freight train’s schedules are 
subject to the passenger train’s 
schedules. For more on these 
differences see Pouryousef, 
Lautala and White (2013)
Passenger 
services
Extensive passenger 
services, 79% of 
the train-km are by 
passenger trains
Few passenger services mostly 
concentrated along the Northeast 
corridor, some commuter 
services
In Europe passenger trains 
have priority. Lines are more 
congested. Most investment goes 
to improve passenger services
Source: Eurostat, Furtado 2012, Pouryousef, Lautala and White (2013)
Even if sizable gains in the train’s capacity were to occur in Europe, it is not clear to what extent 
this could indeed ensure financial stability of the railways. A reduction in the number of trains would 
imply a reduction in frequency of service and an increase in the lot sizes to be shipped. Can this be 
accommodated by the market and industry? Such a move would probably narrow the client base 
of European railways to heavy industries and ports, but that is exactly the client base that sustains 
freight railways. The question then is, to what extent, given the market conditions, the investments 
required to enhance productivity can be covered by the productivity gains, namely, the reduction in 
operational costs?
POLICY AND MARKET STRUCTURE
Some policy differences have already been mentioned: the Jones Act that restricts cabotage in the 
U.S., the priority given to passenger rail in Europe, plus higher fuel costs and more extensive road 
tolls. But what about the distinct market structure and regulation? How does it affect the railroads’ 
performance and productivity?
Both in Europe and the U.S., railways faced a deep crisis in the post World War II years, but 
the policy answers and how the market evolved followed distinct paths. In the U.S. the railways had 
been privately owned but heavily regulated. The “Northeast rail crisis” in the 1970s (when several 
major U.S. railways went bankrupt) was the starting point for sweeping reforms. The Rail Passenger 
Service Act of 1970 that created Amtrak relieved freight railroads from the losses associated with 
providing intercity passenger services, around $200 million per year, or $850 million in today’s 
dollars, according to Association of American Railroads (2012). The Regional Rail Reorganization 
Act of 1973 consolidated all the bankrupt railroads into Conrail (Consolidated Rail Corporation). 
The Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 allowed for extensive federal 
funding to ensure both Conrail´s financial survival and capital investments. It also significantly 
reduced federal regulation of railroads, starting the deregulation process. In 1980, the Staggers Rail 
Act, the most mentioned legislative reform, was passed. It allowed railways to decide which routes 
to use, which services to offer and what prices to charge. Two other events occurred, including a 
process of mergers. There were more than 70 Class I railroads in the early 1970s; now and for the 
last 10 years there were only seven (DOT-BTS). Second, there was an increase in the quantity of 
track owned by non-Class I railroads (regional, local, and switch and terminal). They owned 10% of 
the tracks in 1980 and 32% in 2008 (Martland 2012). These companies took over many low density 
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traffic lines abandoned by the Class I railroads and concentrated in “maneuver intensive” sites (large 
industrial sidings, ports, some terminals). 
These reforms, together with the productivity enhancement investments already mentioned, 
resulted in a revival of the U.S. railways (see Figure 1) (Wright 2011, Kriem 2011). A key driver 
for this was a dramatic reduction in costs that led to a great increase in productivity (Wilson 1997, 
Vellturo et al. 1992).
In order to revitalize the industry in Europe, the EU response, starting in 1991 (Council of the 
European Communities 1991), was to move towards a single and open market. An open market 
means the end of state-owned monopolies, and the separation of infrastructure and operations, either 
through full separation or the creation of holdings where different divisions of the same group 
are responsible for either operations or infrastructure. This allowed different railway operators to 
compete for rail services on the same network. A single market means that no country could block 
companies of other countries (at least from the EU) to provide services on their network, and also 
that technical and operational barriers between different countries’ networks should progressively 
be removed.
Table 6: Policy and Market
Europe	(EU27) U.S. Comments
Political 27 sovereign member states One sovereign state
It is slower and more 
complex to implement 
common policies across the 
EU27. 
Market Structure
Open access. Separation 
of infrastructure and 
operations. Regulator 
supervises non-
discriminatory access to 
the infrastructure
Vertical integration. 
Railways provide 
transportation and own the 
infrastructure 
In the U.S. each railway 
has control over its 
network. In Europe no 
operator controls the 
network.
Competition
”Coincident” over the 
same lines/routes rail 
competition.
Parallel competition 
with other railways. 
Competition with trucks 
and sometimes barges.
In the U.S. almost all 
regions/clients can be 
served by two railways, 
nonetheless they can better 
protect their market.
Types of railroads
Infrastructure Managers, 
Freight Operators, 
Passenger Operators, 
Freight and Passenger 
Operators, Holdings
Class I, Regional, Local, 
Switch and Terminals 
(difference is business 
volume and length of 
network owned)
In the U.S. railways are 
classified by their size. In 
Europe by their function.
Source: Author
The first railway package in 2001, the second package in 2004, and the third in 2007 all 
introduced legislation in order to further pursue the original goal of a single and open market. For 
freight services, the second railway package introduced full open access in 2007. This was applied 
in all EU countries except Ireland, but the removal of barriers to interoperability is still an ongoing 
process (Zunder, Islam, and Marinov 2010). The European Commission 4th Railway package draft 
proposal of December 2012 aimed at the complete separation between infrastructure and operations, 
no longer allowing for a holding model (e.g., Deutsche Bahn). This was dropped in the final proposal 
due to intense lobbying by Germany (Berkeley 2013).
The results of these reforms are far from what was achieved in the U.S. It is recognized in 
European Commission (2010) that, at best, there was a stabilization of rail modal share and that de 
77
JTRF Volume 52 No. 2, Summer 2013
facto monopolies still exist in most EU countries. As was previously mentioned, the financial results 
of most rail undertakings are precarious.
Posner (2007) argues that “in North America there is competition as a result of deregulation, 
whereas in Europe, you are trying to force competition through regulation.(...)It is an institutional 
fundamental of the European environment, and I think it is the single biggest problem.(...)In Europe, 
in my opinion, the focus has been more on having competition even before considering service or 
capacity, so the priorities have been reversed and I think that explains much of the results.”
Figure 4: Rail Share of Inland Modes, 2010 (% based on tkm)
Source: Eurostat
U.S. and European Freight Railways
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The assumptions made in Europe regarding the positive effects of introducing intra-rail 
competition on the same network/lines and implementing a market structure that completely 
separates operations and infrastructure are disputable (Cantos 2001, Growitsch and Wetzel 2009, 
Ivaldi and Mccullough 2008, Friebel, Ivaldi and Vibes 2010, Asmild et al. 2009, Merkert, Smith 
and Nash 2010, Bitzan 2003). As stated in Association of American Railroads (2011a), “open access 
would make it more difficult to operate a railroad efficiently and profitably due to government 
interference and a lack of coordination between infrastructure investment decisions and operational 
goals.”
It is also challenging under an “open access” model to capture private investment for infrastructure 
management. The UK experience with Railtrack had to be reverted because access charges could 
not finance a privately owned company (Jupe 2009). In Estonia, the vertically integrated railways 
were privatized in 2001, but in 2007 they were renationalized because regulation made private 
management unfeasible (Posner 2007). The only significant privately owned rail infrastructure in 
Europe is the Eurotunnel.
Still, the ongoing reforms seem to be delivering some positive results (Friebel, Ivaldi, and 
Vibes 2010, Growitsch and Wetzel 2009), including vertical separation (Cantos, Manuel Pasto, and 
Serrano 2010, Asmild et al. 2009). But many of the studies do not take into account external factors 
that greatly influence freight railways’ productivity, e.g., in the United Kingdom, coal production 
decreased and imports increased, so the tkm of coal moved by rail greatly increased (Posner 2008). 
External factors like these vary widely across Europe, as do the ways the reforms were implemented 
(IBM Business Consulting Services 2006). The networks and railways themselves are very distinct, 
including their modal share (Figure 4). Finding causal relationships between each component of 
the reform and its effects on productivity (either positive or negative) across Europe is problematic.
The situation in Eastern Europe and Scandinavia is examined by Ludvigsen and Osland (2009). 
In Norway, the reforms were an opportunity for wider changes in the existing system, namely, in 
the services provided. The main railway operator (the incumbent) focused on the most profitable 
services (combined/intermodal), while new entrants (including incumbents from other countries) 
picked up some of the abandoned markets (carload). This situation has some similarities with what 
happened in the U.S. between Class I railroads and Short Lines. In Norway, there was some recovery 
of rail modal share and the financial situation of the railways improved, although it is not yet stable.
In Eastern Europe, new entrants competed directly with the incumbents for the same services 
(namely, the more profitable unit/block trains) and gained a sizable market share (40% in Romania 
and, above 20% in Poland, according to European Commission 2009a), but rail modal share 
continued to decrease.
The article by Santos, Furtado, and Marques (2010) about the effects of regulatory changes in 
Portugal, illustrates the complexity of actually implementing reforms beyond legislative compliance. 
The negative (in the case of the infrastructure manager), or anaemic (in the case of the operator), 
evolution of productivity during the period studied, in a country where the reforms “seemed to be 
appropriate and ambitious, at least when compared with those that occurred in other EU countries, 
like in France, where the regulator is not separate from the government, or in Germany, where 
there is vertical integration,” should lead to the question: Are there other factors more relevant to 
productivity increase than regulatory changes per se? The Portuguese freight operator average net 
ton per train is 60% of the European average (see Figure 2). This greatly explains the high expenses 
per ton-mile (see Figure 3). Without significantly decreasing this number there is little hope of 
obtaining increments in productivity and a financially stable situation. The regulation adopted 
should help solve this problem, or at least it should not be an obstacle. But it cannot, by itself, solve 
the problem.
The same can be argued for the increase of rail´s modal share. There is evidence of structural 
inelasticity of modal substitution in freight transport. Rich, Kveiborg, and Hansen (2011) examined 
the Scandinavian case (where rail has a higher share than the EU27 average). For many commodities 
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and Origin – Destination pairs, modal substitution from truck to rail does not occur even if rail 
prices decrease and service level increases. The main reason is the sparsity of the rail network when 
compared with the road network. A reduction of this inelasticity and correspondent increase in 
demand is only possible if there are improvements (or extensions) of the rail infrastructure/network.
In the U.S., the legislative reforms gave railways a free hand so that they could adapt their 
services and network to the market. But these reforms were not confined to deregulation (Staggers 
Act). They were part of a wider set of changes: some services were abandoned; some routes were 
consolidated; charges were lowered or increased depending on existing competition and cost 
coverage; investments were focused on productivity enhancements like longer and heavier trains 
or double stacking, especially on high density lines where demand justifies it. At the same time 
there were mergers between the bigger companies, which likely allowed gains from economies of 
scale and gave the railroads networks that are closer to the size of their markets (Martland 2012, 
Furtado 2012). Still, it is hard to quantify the exact impact of mergers and if those impacts were 
all positive (Vellturo et al. 1992). Specialized non-Class I railroads took over several lower density 
lines abandoned by the Class I and “maneuver intensive” sites such as ports or other large industrial 
sidings. Coal production increased in the Poweder River Basin (whereas, before it was mostly 
concentrated in the Appalachian Region), increasing the distance of coal shipments from production 
to consumption centers and the corresponding length of haul for rail (Association of American 
Railroads 2011b). Technological breakthroughs in other fields, like advances in communications 
and information technologies, allowed increases in labor productivity (Martland 2012).
All the above are examples of developments, some more related to regulation changes than 
others, that played a role in transforming the industry. From a situation of crisis, which the “Northeast 
rail crisis” of the early 1970s is the most acute example, the railroads recovered and have stable 
financial results.6 The critical contribution of regulation reform to the sector revival was that it 
increased the control railways have over their own networks and services provided.
In Europe, the regulation introduced did the opposite, control over the rail systems was divided. 
In each European country there are different nuances on how this was implemented (European 
Commission 2009b), but the trend to split control over the system between different entities is 
common. Like in the U.S., changes were necessary in order to revive the sector. The previous model 
of state-owned monopolies closely linked to the government needed to be reformed. The shock 
provoked by the introduction of competitive pressure and the dismantling (or reorganization) of the 
previous monopolies seems to have produced some positive results, but they are far from uniform 
across the EU27. Contrary to the U.S., a clear revival of the sector did not occur after the reforms 
were set in motion. It should be noted that full open access for freight was implemented only in 2007 
and soon after there was a world crisis that caused a sharp fall in freight movements.
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
U.S. railways have around 35% of the modal share measured in tkm. In Europe the number is 
close to 10%. Structural differences can explain nearly all that gap, about 98% according to the 
methodology employed. Competiveness of non-surface modes accounts for around 26% of that 
difference, underlying the importance of the sea mode in Europe. Shipment distances for surface 
modes is responsible for almost half the gap (46%); the much longer shipment distances in the U.S. 
play a crucial role. The difference in the commodity mix corresponds to 26% of the gap. This gives 
a measure of the impact of the much higher proportion of coal moved in the U.S. by surface modes. 
Given these inherent differences, the modal share gap between the U.S. and Europe is very small. 
So, it is not reasonable to expect that railways in the EU27 should have a similar modal share to the 
U.S., even less to set this as a policy target.
To move the same number of tons, seven times more trains are necessary in Europe. The average 
net tons per train in Europe is 86% less than in the U.S. In addition, this disparity is much less 
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constrained by structural factors. This is an important reason why the U.S. railways have a stable 
financial situation, while the same is not true in Europe. Costs per ton-mile in Europe are four times 
higher than in the U.S., while revenues are only two times higher. The revival of U.S. railways was 
greatly due to an increase in productivity, for which a reduction in costs was crucial.
A key component for a revival of European freight railways has to be a reduction of operational 
costs, of which an increase in the net tons per train, by increasing their length/weight, is an important 
component. An important question for future research is to what extent, given the existing market 
and its medium-term evolution, the investments required to enhance productivity can be covered 
by the productivity gains, i.e., the reduction in operational costs. This question can be further 
detailed: given an investment plan and set of actions geared to enhance productivity, could the 
freight railways be financially sustainable? Or what would be the share of public funding needed? 
To what extent could the freight operator cover the infrastructure investment costs required for its 
own sustainability? To answer this, a more in-depth analysis of a case study is required. Portugal, 
where the average net tons per train is 60% below even the European average, is a case where 
productivity enhancements are even more necessary than in other EU27 member states.
Changes in legislation and regulation impact productivity, only to the extent that they can actually 
induce pressure that results in technical, operational, or service changes that increase the outputs/
inputs ratios, including the financial ones. The European “open access” model faces some questions 
for which there are no conclusive answers yet. To what extent can an alignment in operational needs 
and infrastructure investment be achieved? How will the returns of such investments be shared 
by the different agents? How can there be private financing of infrastructure, when there is no 
control over the charges and services there provided? The changes introduced in the U.S. from 
1970 to 1980 seem to have delivered more than the European reform process started in 1991, and 
that culminated in 2007 with full open access for freight services. But other factors, besides these 
reforms, influenced both the U.S. revival and the anaemic European results. 
Acknowledgements
This paper benefited from the feedback provided by Carl Martland (retired senior research associate 
at MIT, specialist in rail transportation that participated in many studies affecting rail industry 
profitability and productivity) and José Viegas (secretary-general of the International Transport 
Forum (ITF) at the OECD, responsible for numerous studies and projects on transport systems, at 
the urban, regional, national, and European level).
Endnotes
1. Requires that all goods transported by water between U.S. ports be carried in U.S. flag ships, 
constructed in the United States, owned by U.S. citizens, and crewed by U.S. citizens or U.S. 
permanent residents.
2. The number of significant figures used in the table was the same as Vassalos and Fagan (2007) 
in order to present a consistent comparison. These numbers do provide an order of magnitude 
of the effects studied, but it should be taken into account that they are strongly dependent 
on the assumptions made and on the accuracy of the data employed (some of which are also 
obtained through estimation).
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3. These numbers are averages and common statistical indicators for freight railroads’ 
performance. Length of haul is the ratio between total ton-miles and total tons moved (ton-
miles/tons). Net tons is the ratio between total ton-miles and total train-tons (ton-miles/train-
miles). The number of trains presented in the table was obtained by dividing the total tons (B 
in the table) by the net tons (A in the table). So the number of trains presented is a reasonable 
estimation, but not the actual number of trains.
4. Contrary to Europe, in the U.S., there is no maximum train length imposed by regulation. 
Still, trains are generally no more than three km long. In Europe, some bulk trains in Eastern 
and Scandinavian countries are longer than 750 meters, but even there they are the exception.
5. Besides the difference in length, with intermodal trains in the U.S. ranging mostly from 
around 1.2 to 2.4 km (in Europe they are from 0.5 to 0.75 km), in the U.S. along many routes, 
double stacking was made possible by upgrades to the infrastructure and rolling stock.
6. Although railways can finance maintenance, renewals and some new projects, major new 
investments require some degree of public funding. In Cambridge Systematics (2007) and 
Association of American Railroads (2007), it is estimated that around 30% of the capital 
investment necessary to increase the network capacity will have to come from some sort 
of government financing. It is argued that this is necessary in the long term (having 2035 
as a horizon) to relieve congestion in the main rail corridors, due to an increase in demand. 
Another issue would be to have public policy explicitly designed to move freight from trucks 
to rail. This was not the case in the U.S. Such policies may even require railroads to focus 
less on productivity. Indeed much of the short-haul and general merchandise traffic was 
abandoned by the railways, which concentrated resources in more productive long-haul bulk 
and container traffic.
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